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Abstract
After the recent global financial crisis, great focus has been raised on the identification of systemically important banks. 
Therefore, simple and intuitive indicators on banks’ systemic importance are urgently needed. This paper provides a new 
estimation method to measure and identify systemically important banks. We define quantitatively a systemic importance 
score (SIS) as the expected number of bank failures in the banking system given one particular bank fails. The SIS 
concentrates mainly on an existence of a contagion effect in an average meaning. In the empirical analysis, the SIS index is 
applied to identify the systemically important banks of China. The empirical results demonstrate that the big five state-
owned banks are systemically important banks. Besides, IB, SPDB and CMB are also perceived as systemically important.
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1. Introduction
Since the recent global financial crisis, a growing amount of literature began to study the overall risk in the 
financial system and has developed models for risk integration or aggregation [1-3]. Considering the long-
lasting, destructive effect of financial crisis, the authorities and regulators may have an incentive to prevent the 
failure or impairment of a large, highly interconnected financial institution because such a failure or 
impairment would potentially pose an unavoidable risk to the whole financial system and consequently harm 
the real economy. Once contagious risk begins spreading, authorities have limited alternatives to stop it, 
thereby undermining financial stability. At this time, a supporting bailout to restore financial stability during 
the crisis is quite necessary. There exists a debate on support or objection of bailing out large financial 
institutions. A common supporting argument holds that if a particular financial institution is “too big to fail”, it
should be bailed out. However, the correctness of such an assertion needs careful verification. The primary 
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question is to decide which financial institutions should be favored by authorities. Thus, to design an 
appropriate measure on identifying the systemic importance of financial institutions is the major difficulty.
More specifically, we need to measure the degree to which the failure of a particular bank will contribute to the 
systemic risk.
A multitude of academic contributions have been devoted to measure the systemic importance of banks. The 
indicator-based measurement approach proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [4] provides 
an assessment methodology which takes account of five dimensions of systemic importance: size, 
interconnectedness, substitutability, complexity and the cross-jurisdictional activity of a bank to define global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs). As a result, the regulators have identified 29 banks as G-SIBs. 
Afterwards, the Group of Twenty [5] considers the expeditious extension of the G-SIB requirements to 
domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) based on 12 principles.
Also, some scholars try to figure out the systemic importance of financial institutions by introducing new 
items emphasizing on the potential systemic impact if one or several particular financial institutions fail. Before 
calling for a strategy to regulate the financial system as a whole, Bernanke [6] addressed the problem of 
financial institutions that are deemed “too big to fail" or “too interconnected to fail”. Besides, Rajan[7] focused 
on the item “too systemic to fail” to identify the institution whose business interacts in complex ways with the 
financial system and will cause systemic consequences once fails. Otherwise, Moore and Zhou [8] thought that 
engaging in non-traditional banking activities towards a more diversified positions will enhance the systemic 
importance of a financial institution, namely “too non-traditional to fail”.
As for more measures on systemic importance, recent empirical studies have put forward several applicable 
approaches. One is the conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) measure conceptualized in Adrian and 
Brunnermeier [9]. CoVaR quantifies the extent to which financial distress of a financial institution can increase 
the tail risk of other institutions and depicts its marginal contribution to the overall systemic risk. Further 
speaking, systemic importance of one particular institution to the system is measured when treating all the other 
institutions as a whole. The setup of the CoVaR measure indicates that it calls for sufficient, high-frequency 
market data, such as equity price data stream. This makes it more applicative for developed countries with an 
advanced financial market. Developing countries like China usually possess a restricted financial market with a 
small amount of listed financial institutions, thus making it not applicable. Another is the Shapley value 
methodology applied by Tarashedv et al. [10] to a stylized banking system consisting of 60 international banks 
to estimate the correlation among three drivers of systemic importance. Their empirical results show that size 
of a financial institution is by far the principal determinant of systemic importance. With the Shapley value 
measure, the degree of systemic importance is measured by the share of systemic risk that is attributed to each 
of them based on its average contribution to the risk of all groupings of institutions. Although the Shapley 
value measure is very intuitive in interpretation and flexible in application, it requires a large amount of 
calculation to prohibit its empirical application to a large financial system [8].
Although a number of methods and indicators on bank’s systemic importance have sprang up, some 
potential downsides make them not easy to carry out and non-intuitive. For example, the indicator-based 
measurement considers five dimensions of systemic importance, thus practically needs a large sample of banks 
and plentiful data for all banks that incorporates the necessary information required. This makes the 
implementation of such an approach seems to be difficult. Besides, measures based on high-frequency market
data require that the financial market meet efficiency-market hypothesis, thus not applicable for developing 
countries like China. Therefore, some simple yet intuitive indicators on systemic importance are urgently 
needed.
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This paper introduces a practicable estimation method to identify systemically important banks by newly 
defining a systemic importance score (SIS) index quantitatively. Primarily, it’s based on the bilateral exposure 
matrix representing the bilateral lending relationships of the banking system. Given that an initial bank fails 
due to some non-interbank shock, we define the SIS as the expected number of total defaults that the initial 
failure of one bank will bring. Clearly and intuitively, the SIS index is somewhat a conception of mean value 
and emphasizes more on the systemic impact, i.e. how a distress in one bank leads to a crisis in the whole 
system. Given that an initial bank fails, the more bank defaults occur, the more severe the systemic impact is,
and the larger the systemic importance is. According to the ranking order of the systemic importance score, the 
systemically importance banks can be easily figured out. Finally, we apply this measure to Chinese banking 
system in 2013 and empirical results are analyzed.
2. The systemic importance score (SIS) 
The systemic importance score is proposed in this section based on risk contagion simulation through the
interbank market. In fact, how to define systemically important banks, as well as what constitutes systemic 
importance of a bank has not yet come to an agreement. In many literatures, systemically important banks are 
frequently labeled as too-big-to-fail ones, whilst FSB [11] regards a bank, which has specific features implying 
that its failure would cause a significant disruption to the rest of the financial system and even to the real 
economy, as systemically important. Afterwards the financial crisis, risk contagion and aggregation for country
risk, software process risk, especially for financial industry, have really become a hot issue [12-14]. Much 
research has been contributed to the risk contagion in banking system since it is one of the most significant 
parts in financial industry [15-17]. Consistently, the latter definition relates assessment of systemic importance 
to the potential to have a large negative impact on the financial system and the real economy, thus being more 
convincing and practicable. Specifically, given that a particular bank goes bankruptcy initially, we define the 
SIS as the expected number of total defaults that the initial failure will bring. Consistently, the SIS index 
proposed here stresses mainly on the systemic impact of banks and provides an intuitive interpretation of each 
bank’s systemic importance. 
Consider a banking system consisting of N banks. Then the SIS is defined mathematically as
                                                                                                                                                           (1)
where ݌௞ is the probability that the default of an initial bank will bring k total defaults. Consequently, the index 
quantizes the systemic importance of one bank as an aggregation of the conditional probabilities of other banks’ 
failure given its failure. k represents the severity of potential contagion that a bank would cause. It is 
noteworthy that the value k depends greatly on the level of loss given default since the failure of a single bank 
may not result in knock-on or domino effects. For each bank that fails due to a sudden shock, k varies with the 
variation of loss given default. Additionally, ݌௞ is corresponding to each k and also closely relates to the loss 
given default. Under different contagion mechanisms used to simulate the contagion process, loss given default 
is usually denoted as a rate that ranges from 0 to 1. As long as the distribution that loss rate given default is 
assumed, the probability ݌௞ can be determined. Given the sudden failure of each individual bank, combine the k
with its corresponding probability ݌௞, and thus its SIS is calculated. With the distinguishable SISs of different 
banks, it is sufficient to identify the systemically important banks.
We differentiate the SIS index measure from previous measures or indicators on systemic importance in two 
aspects. Firstly, the SIS index provides an intuitive and straightforward interpretation to the systemic 
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importance of one bank. More specifically, it is the expectation value of the total defaults resulting from the 
failure of an initial bank and thus indicates how many banks would eventually fail on average. For an initial 
bank, the more bank failures occur, the more severe the systemic impact is, and thus the more systemically 
important it is. Secondly, this measure can nearly be applied to all kinds of contagion mechanisms due to its 
flexibility. Besides, the more practical the distribution about the loss rate given default is provided, the more 
applicative the SIS index is.
The definition of the SIS index indicates that this measure can capture the general instability of the whole 
banking system associated with the failure of a single bank and is quite convenient to carry out for regulators 
and authorities. Thereby, it may serve authorities as a quantitative and applicative tool to figure out 
systemically important banks, and thus focus their attention and resources on where the contagion severity 
resulting from an institution failing is estimated to be the greatest. It can also contribute to the macro-prudential 
regulation on financial system.
To calculate the SIS index, the key procedure is the estimation of the conditional probability that k total 
failures occur given that one particular bank fails, namely ݌௞. It greatly depends on the contagion mechanism. 
Empirically, this paper employs the sequential default algorithm developed by Furfine [18], which is the most 
widely used by empirical literature. According to the sequential default algorithm, loss given default for each 
bank except the initial one incorporates not only interbank loss stemming from the credit contagion channel in 
interbank market, but also non-interbank loss due to the non-bankers’ behavior and other interbank channels. 
Once the total loss given default exceeds its capital, a bank fails. The contagion process ceases until no more 
bank fails.
3. Empirical study
Our empirical analysis is performed on the Chinese banking system in 2013. After the bilateral exposure 
matrix is estimated with the maximum entropy method, we simulate the contagion process on the basis of the
sequential default algorithm. Then we calculate the SIS of each listed bank. The empirical results are presented 
and analyzed in detail below.
3.1. Data description and preprocessing
The primary element in simulating the contagion process and estimating the SIS measure is the bilateral 
exposure matrix. For this purpose, data on each bank’s aggregate interbank loans and deposits are collected 
from the data stream. Therefore the dataset for constructing the SIS measure consists of the latest annual 
financial reports of Chinese listed banks in 2013. Non-listed banks are ruled out because their financial reports 
are unavailable since they have no need to release them. Table 1 provides the 16 listed banks and their 
abbreviations.
Table 1 The 16 listed commercial banks of China
Number Bank Number Bank
1 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)* 9 Huaxia Bank (HXB)
2 China Construction Bank (CCB)* 10 Industrial Bank (IB)
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Note: * denotes the big five state-owned banks of China.
To estimate the exposure matrix, we collect listed banks’ balance sheet data. Instead of providing aggregated 
interbank assets and liabilities directly, in the annual financial reports, the sub-items of each bank’s aggregated 
interbank assets and liabilities are given. Specifically, for each individual bank, the interbank assets encompass 
deposits in other banks, call loan to banks and buying back the sale of assets while the interbank liabilities 
incorporate deposits from other banks, interbank borrowing and assets sold for repurchase. Also, all the equity 
capital data are drawn from the 2013 annual reports directly. Since the maximum entropy method is carried out 
based on a complete Chinese banking system in which the total assets equal to the total liabilities, we construct 
a hypothetical bank to represent all the non-listed banks. Thus the 16 listed banks, together with the 
hypothetical bank, constitute the Chinese banking system.
As for the hypothetical bank, to derive its interbank assets and liabilities, we perform a linear regression 
analysis between a bank’s total assets and aggregated interbank assets. Strictly speaking from the econometric 
angle, the linear aggression analysis is not rigorous due to the limited data of Chinese listed banks. However, 
what matters for the empirical study are the bilateral exposures between 16 listed banks while in contagion 
process simulation, the hypothetical bank is excluded due to the fact that it’s a mixture of all non-listed banks 
and the interbank lending relationships among them are unknown and complex. According to the BCBS, the 
aggregated assets of 16 listed banks approximately amount to 95.14 trillion CNY, accounting to nearly 62.86% 
of the total assets of the whole Chinese banking system which are 151.35 trillion CNY. Therefore, once the 
regression function is determined, the interbank assets of the hypothetical bank are calculated.
3.2. Empirical results
We derive the bilateral exposure matrix of Chinese banking system in 2013 with the most commonly used 
maximum entropy method. It is regarded as a sensible and unbiased approach, because it practically provides a 
distribution about the interbank loans and deposits with as little information as possible. Then the contagious 
effects of an assumed sudden failure of each individual bank are simulated with the sequential default 
algorithm. In total, the empirical analysis allows us to study the effects of sudden insolvency of each of the 16 
listed banks. Therefore, following a non-interbank shock, we record the number of total banks that fail until the 
contagion ceases.
Table 2 presents the 16×16 matrix of bilateral exposures, with each element    signifying the credit exposure 
of bank i to bank j. It is noted that the elements in the principal diagonal are zero since one bank cannot lend to 
itself. Obviously, the top five largest exposures are centrally among the big five state-owned banks, with the 
exception that IB holds the fifth largest credit exposure to BOC. It indicates that IB actively engages in the 
3 Bank of China (BOC)* 11 China Everbright Bank (CEB)
4 Agriculture Bank of China (ABC)* 12 Pingan Bank (PAB)
5 Bank of Communications (BOCOM)* 13 China Merchants Bank (CMB) 
6 China international Trust and Investment Corp.Bank 
(CITIC)
14 Bank of Beijing (BOBJ)
7 China Minsheng Banking Corp.Ltd. (CMBC) 15 Bank of Ningbo (BONB)
8 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (SPDB) 16 Bank of Nanjing (BONJ)
ijx
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interbank business and closely connected to other banks. In fact, the average interbank assets of IB reach up to 
about 33.7% in 2013, ranking the top first among the 16 listed banks. Besides, the credit exposures holding by 
the big five state-owned banks and IB to CMBC, CITIC and SPDB are also relatively large, indicating that 
these three banks are also quite active in the interbank market.
Table 2 The bilateral exposure matrix of Chinese listed banks in 2013 
billion CNY ICBC CCB BOC ABC BOCOM CITIC CMBC SPDB
ICBC 0 67.3 147 72.2 81.9 57.6 36.7 62.9
CCB 81.4 0 100.8 49.4 56.1 39.5 25.1 43.1
BOC 160.4 90.9 0 97.5 110.6 77.9 49.6 85
ABC 156.3 88.5 193.5 0 107.7 75.8 48.3 82.8
BOCOM 61.9 35.1 76.6 37.6 0 30 19.1 32.8
CITIC 54 30.6 66.9 32.8 37.3 0 16.7 28.6
CMBC 38.9 22 48.2 23.6 26.8 18.9 0 20.6
SPDB 59.7 33.8 73.9 36.3 41.2 29 18.5 0
HXB 40.5 22.9 50.1 24.6 27.9 19.6 12.5 21.5
IB 117.7 66.7 145.8 71.5 81.2 57.1 36.4 62.4
CEB 37.9 21.5 47 23 26.1 18.4 11.7 20.1
PAB 81.2 46 100.6 49.4 56 39.4 25.1 43
CMB 57.1 32.4 70.7 34.7 39.4 27.7 17.6 30.3
BOBJ 31 17.5 38.3 18.8 21.3 15 9.6 16.4
BONB 8.1 4.6 10 4.9 5.6 3.9 2.5 4.3
BONJ 8.2 4.6 10.1 5 5.6 4 2.5 4.3
HXB IB CEB PAB CMB BOBJ BONB BONJ
ICBC 27 88.3 39.8 47.2 44.4 26.3 9.9 9.2
CCB 18.5 60.5 27.3 32.3 30.4 18 6.8 6.3
BOC 36.5 119.4 53.8 63.8 60 35.5 13.4 12.5
ABC 35.5 116.3 52.4 62.1 58.4 34.6 13 12.1
BOCOM 14.1 46 20.7 24.6 23.1 13.7 5.2 4.8
CITIC 12.3 40.2 18.1 21.5 20.2 12 4.5 4.2
CMBC 8.8 28.9 13 15.5 14.5 8.6 3.2 3
SPDB 13.6 44.4 20 23.7 22.3 13.2 5 4.6
HXB 0 30.1 13.6 16.1 15.1 9 3.4 3.1
IB 26.8 0 39.4 46.8 44 26.1 9.8 9.1
CEB 8.6 28.2 0 15.1 14.2 8.4 3.2 2.9
PAB 18.5 60.4 27.2 0 30.4 18 6.8 6.3
CMB 13 42.5 19.1 22.7 0 12.6 4.8 4.4
BOBJ 7 23 10.4 12.3 11.6 0 2.6 2.4
BONB 1.8 6 2.7 3.2 3 1.8 0 0.6
BONJ 1.9 6.1 2.7 3.2 3.1 1.8 0.7 0
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Before calculating the SIS, we need to simulate the contagion process given that the 16 banks fail initially 
one by one based on the sequential default algorithm. For simplicity, the interbank loss rate and the non-
interbank loss rate, denoted as Į and ȕ, both range from 0 to 1 with the step size of 0.01. Thus we obtain 101 
values, respectively for Į and ȕ. Total defaults k during the contagion process simulation is recorded. To 
provide a clear and straightforward view, we use the three-dimensional surface plots to portray the variation of 
k when both loss rates given default Į and ȕ change simultaneously, as illustrated in Figure 1. The bank name 
above the chart represents the bank that fails initially. Considering the number of banks, only the contagion 
severity of ICBC is presented.
As shown in Fig. 1, the horizontal axes respectively denote interbank loss rate Į and non-interbank loss rate 
ȕ, while the vertical axis denotes the total defaults k, ranging from 1 to 16. Different color represents different 
number of defaults. If no contagion occurs, k equals to 1; if there exists a systemic-wide contagion and all the 
banks fail, k equals to 16. The oblique line in the horizontal plane indicates that there exists a threshold value 
for Į, as well as ȕ. Similar results appeared in Li JP et al. [19]. Given the initial failure of each individual bank 
at each certain Į, contagion won’t happen until ȕ exceeds a threshold value. Nevertheless, when Į and ȕare 
greater than the threshold value, the number of total defaults increases sharply, as the vertical fault surface 
shows.
Fig.1 The total defaults k along with the changing of loss rates given default Įand ȕ
According to the simulation results, we then apply the proposed SIS index measure to identify the 
systemically important banks of Chinese banking system. , representing the probability that the failure of an 
initial bank will bring k total failures, is closely related to the variation range of loss rates Į and ȕ. Under 
different pairs of Į and ȕ, the value of k can be the same, which can be observed from Fig. 1. A simplified but 
significant assumption is made that Į and ȕ both follow the uniform distribution. Since there are 10201 
(101×101) pairs of Į and ȕ in total, the probability for each scenario is thus           . In the simulation process, 
the total number of defaults                        that the initial failure of each individual bank will cause, 1 2 3 10201,, ,TD TD TD TD}
kp
1 10201
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respectively corresponding to each pair of parameters, are recorded. Therefore, the SISs of the 16 listed banks, 
equaling to                                                , are calculated and presented in Fig. 2.
From Fig. 2, we can see the Big Five state-owned banks are all at the top. It indicates that they are all 
systemically important banks. This agrees with our theoretical prediction. If a bank’s assets size is large and its 
activities comprise a large share of the whole financial system, then its fail or impairment is more likely to 
cause a system-wide risk to the whole system, even the real economy. The larger the bank, the more difficult it 
can be replaced by other banks once fails and thus the easier its fail or impairment will harm the whole banking 
system. Thereby, the size of one bank is a key determinant to identify its systemic importance, which partially 
supports the validity of the “too-big-to-fail” argument.
It’s remarkable that IB’s SIS ranks the fourth, even exceeding CCB, in spite of its medium assets size among 
the 16 banks, indicating that IB is quite systemically important. A reasonable explanation is IB’s active 
engagement in the interbank business. Given a complex network of obligations or exposures to other banks, 
sudden financial distress at one bank can materially increase the likelihood of risk contagion in the whole 
banking system. This indicates that a bank’s systemic importance is not only closely related to its assets size, 
but also likely to be positively related to its interconnectedness vis-à-vis other banks.
Considering the distinguishable SISs of different banks, here we set the threshold value between 
systemically important banks and non-systemically important banks as 3. Banks with a higher-than-3 SIS are 
systemic important while others are not. Therefore, based on the results, it can be concluded that BOC, ICBC, 
BOCOM, ABC, IB, CCB, SPDB and CMB are the systemically important banks. It is noteworthy that BOC 
and ICBC should even be paid more attention by authorities and regulators due to their high-level SISs.
Fig. 2 The systemic importance scores of the 16 listed banks in descending order
BONJ
BONB
BOBJ
HXB
PAB
CEB
CITIC
CMBC
CMB
SPDB
CCB
IB
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BOCOM
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1.41
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 2.8
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 6.3
Systemic Importance Score
1 2 10201( ) 1 10201TD TD TD   u
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4. Conclusion
In this paper, a systemic importance score (SIS) on measuring and identifying systemically important banks
is defined. Specifically, the SIS is defined quantitatively as the expected total number of bank failures in the 
banking system given one particular bank fails as the loss rates given default ĮDQGȕYDU\VLPXOWDQHRXVO\%\
applying the SIS index to the 2013 Chinese banking system, the SISs for the 16 listed banks are calculated and 
then ranked in descending order. After setting the threshold value for SIS as 3, it is figured out that BOC, ICBC, 
BOCOM, ABC, IB, CCB, SPDB and CMB are the systemically important banks, in which the IB holds great 
systemic importance even exceeding CCB. The empirical results demonstrate that besides assets size, which is 
the key determinant of systemic importance, interconnectedness with other banks is also positively related to 
one bank’s systemic importance. This somewhat provides a guidance for financial authorities to enhance their 
policy-making and decision-making on whether bailing out when crisis happens.
We hope our work gives some extensions and complements to the systemically important banks 
identification. And there is much left to be done for further research. For example, in this paper, a simplified 
assumption is made that both the interbank loss rate and the external loss rate follow uniform distribution. 
However, if more practical distribution of the parameters can be obtained, the definition of the SIS index will 
also be more applicative.
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